The 'Ordinariness of the EU's Foreign Policy Power: The Use of WTO Litigation as a Means to Export EU Norms, Values and Interests by Melo Araujo, Billy
The 'Ordinariness of the EU's Foreign Policy Power: The Use of
WTO Litigation as a Means to Export EU Norms, Values and
Interests
Melo Araujo, B. (2015). The 'Ordinariness of the EU's Foreign Policy Power: The Use of WTO Litigation as a
Means to Export EU Norms, Values and Interests. Global Journal of Comparative Law, 4(2), 143-165. DOI:
10.1163/2211906X-00402001
Published in:
Global Journal of Comparative Law
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2015 Brill
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
! 1!
THE$‘ORDINARINESS’$OF$THE$EU’s$FOREIGN$POLICY$POWER:$THE$USE$OF$WTO$
LITIGATION$AS$A$MEANS$TO$EXPORT$EU$NORMS,$VALUES$AND$INTERESTS$
$
Billy$Melo$Araujo,$Queen’s$University$Belfast$
Billy.Melo_Araujo@qub.ac.uk$
$
DRAFT$–$NOT$FOR$QUOTATION$$
To$be$published$in$The$Global$Journal$of$Comparative$Law(2015)$Vol$4$no.1$
$
$
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1. Introduction 
 
Academic literature in the area of international relations has historically 
portrayed the European Union (EU) as a distinctive international actor. Popular 
conceptual frameworks for the EU’s foreign policy action, such as ‘Civilian Power 
Europe’ and ‘Normative Power Europe’ contend that, unlike to traditional powers, 
the EU seeks to influence the international community through the dissemination of 
supposedly universal norms and value achieved by non-coercive and cooperative 
means. Such distinctiveness is, however, increasingly being contested by 
international relations and legal scholars; with some claiming that the EU’s claims to 
universalism are based on a misguided conflation between European and universal 
norms, whilst others contend that the EU’s power is purely a function of its economic 
power.   
 
! 2!
This article joins the chorus of arguments that claim that the EU’s foreign 
policy power is non-distinctive. It does so by focusing on an important feature of the 
EU’s trade policy, the role of World Trade organization (WTO) dispute settlement in 
the EU’s attempts to promote its interests and norms abroad. It argues, in particular, 
that WTO litigation is a key tool used by the EU not only to further its economic 
interests but also to promote regulatory positions and values that purely reflect its 
specific domestic preferences. In light of this, the article posits that the EU operates 
as a traditional and pragmatic foreign policy power, which is, inter alia, not adverse 
to promoting its self-interest. 
 
Section II provides a descriptive overview of the various roles ascribed in the 
international relations theory to the EU as a foreign policy actor. Section III generally 
examines the dynamic relationship between the WTO litigation and EU domestic 
policy making and the extent to which WTO dispute settlement has become an 
important feature of the EU’s attempts achieve its goals and influence international 
law. Section IV addresses two case studies illustrating how WTO dispute settlement 
is factored into the EU’s internal and external regulatory policy making process in 
order to ensure that its interests and values are externalised.  The first of these 
addresses the EU’s current policy with respect to access to mineral resources, which 
led to two WTO rulings prohibiting import restrictions imposed by China on raw 
materials and rare earths. The second case study focuses on the EU’s legislation 
banning trade in seal products - designed to compel States engaged in seal hunting 
to change their hunting practices in accordance with the EU’s domestic preferences – 
which was recently contested before the WTO judicature. Section V argues, in light 
of the case studies addressed in this article, that rather than shaping international 
law through non-coercive means and by promoting universal values and norms, the 
EU protects and projects its own interests and preferences by using its significant 
economic power to write the rules of the game in its favour. 
 
2. The EU’s Identity as Foreign Policy Power 
 
The progressive rise of the EU (then the European Economic Community) as 
a global actor in the second half of the twentieth century brought into question many 
of the commonly held preconceptions as to how power and influence could be 
exercised in the context of international relations. Power-based politics (or ‘hard 
power’) based on military coercion and associated with nation-states such as the 
United States (US) did not adequately reflect the manner in which the EU has 
typically sought to influence the international community. Because of the absence of 
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any military capability of note, economic policy, diplomacy and cooperation, rather 
than the military might and unilateral action which characterize the US’s approach to 
foreign policy1, have historically been the main tools used by the EU to further its 
interests abroad. The first attempt by international relations scholars to capture the 
distinctive identity of the EU drew a sharp contrast with the military and unilateral 
inclinations of the US. The EU was said to represent a new breed of international 
actor – a ‘civilian power’2 based on the fulfillment of three fundamental criteria: “a) 
the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of 
international objectives; b) the concentration on non-military power, primarily 
economic, means to secure national goals [….]; and c) a willingness to develop 
supranational superstructures to address critical issues of international 
management”3. Contrary to the US then, cooperation and deliberation were the 
means through which the EU would influence others, and it would do so by 
promoting international law and institutions  
 
One of the criticisms aimed at this Civilian Power Europe was that it seeks to 
understand the EU’s role in international relations through the prism of traditional 
Westphalian concepts concerning statehood and power4. Underpinning the idea of 
Civilian Power Europe was the assumption that the EU was forced to find alternative 
means to wield power because it did not have the military capabilities of a nation-
State.  However, ultimately, it operated very much like a traditional foreign policy 
power using a specific form of coercion (economic coercion) to pursue European 
interests abroad. Manners has argued that this assumption fundamentally 
misrepresents what the EU is and does in international relations. According to 
Manners, the distinctive nature of the EU’s foreign policy can be attributed to the fact 
that the EU, itself, was the result of a desire from its Member States to move away 
from the nation-State paradigm and develop a supranational form of governance 
based on the promotion of universal norms and principles such as the respect of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!1!J.!Ruggie,!“American!Exceptionalism,!Exemptionalism!and!Global!Governance”,!KSG!Faculty!Research!Working!Paper!Series,!February!2004!RWP04C006.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.517642.!2 !F.! Duchene,! “The! European! Community! and! the! Uncertainties! of!Interdependence”,! in!M.!Kohnstamm!and!W.!Hager! (eds.)!A"Nation"Writ"Large?"
Foreign"Policy"Problems"before"the"European"Community!(Basingstoke:!MacMillan!(1973).!3!H.!Maull,!“Germany!and!Japan:!The!New!Civilian!Powers”!Foreign"Affairs!69(5)!(1990)!91!at!92C93.!4 !I.! Manners,! “Normative! Power! Europe:! A! Contradiction! in! Terms”!
Journal"of"Common"Market"Studies!40:2!(2002)!235!at!239.!
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human rights, democracy and the rule of law5. It is this normative basis that compels 
the EU to act in a normative way in the context of its international relations 
(Normative Power Europe). According to Manners, the notion of Normative Power 
Europe is based on two key components of the EU’s external action6. Firstly, there is 
the EU’s commitment to disseminate a set of core norms (liberty, democracy, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law) and minor norms (social solidarity, anti-
discrimination, sustainable development and good governance)7, which are reflective 
of its own identity rather than its self-interest. Secondly, the practices through which 
the EU promotes these norms must reflect the EU’s fundamental values. For 
example, the EU should not coerce others into complying with its norms but rather 
engage with them in processes of deliberation and discussion, nor should it impose 
on third countries disciplines that it does not comply with itself8. In other words, 
Normative Power is not simply a narrative a self-projection, whereby the EU 
exercises power by exporting its normative identity abroad, but also part of a long-
term project to create a “more just, cosmopolitical world which empowers people in 
the actual conditions of their lives should”9, and which “must be based on more 
universally accepted values and principles that can be explained to both Europeans 
and non-European alike”10. 
 
The obvious counterpoint to these conceptualizations of the EU as a foreign 
policy actor is the idea of the United States as an ‘exceptionalist’ (that is, as an 
international actor that sees itself as inherently superior and strives to ensure that 
international law reflects its values and norms) and as an exemptionalist (that is, an 
international actor that is above the strictures of international law meaning, for 
example, that the pursuance of national goals can fully justify recourse to 
unilateralism) 11 . This would contrast with the idea of the EU as a civilian or 
normative actor promoting universal norms and values and attached to the pooling 
of sovereignty through international institutions. On this point, Manners posits that !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!5!Ibid!at!241.!6!Ibid!at!242C244.!7!I!Manners,!supra!footnote!4!at243.!8!I!Manners,!“The!Normative!Ethics!of!the!European!Union”"International"
Affairs!84:!1!(2008)!1!at!75C78.!9!Ibid!at!80.!10!Ibid.!11!J.!Rubenfeld,!“Unilateralism!and!Constitutionalism”,!New"York"University"
Law"Review!79(6)!(2004)!1971C2028;!J.!G.!Ruggie,!“Doctrinal!Unilateralism!and!its!Limits”.!In!P.!Forsythe,!P.!MacMahon!and!A.!Wedeman!(eds.)!!Doctrinal!Unilateralism!and!its!Limits!:!America!and!Global!Governance!in!the!New!Century!(New!York:!Routledge!(2006))!31C50.!
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the absence of any claims to exceptionalism is a critical feature of the EU’s normative 
action and that the supposedly ‘universal norms’ that the EU exports as well as its 
commitment to “non–hierarchical relationships” 12  are all informed by the EU’s 
historical mistakes (e.g., colonialism) rather than a conviction based on any supposed 
innate superiority13.  However, such distinctions are increasingly being contested 
with some arguing that exceptionalism, exemptionalism and unilateralism are not 
features that are unique to the US but are also verified in the EU’s foreign policy 
practice14. A particular point of criticism relates to the suggestion under Normative 
Power Europe that the EU differs from other foreign policy powers insofar as its 
actions are driven by a propensity to promote fundamental norms and values that 
are not based on self-interest. This supposed virtuousness of the EU was recently 
rejected by De Burca’s conceptualization the EU’s ‘governance mode’ of foreign 
policy according to which the distinctiveness of the EU’s foreign policy lies not in the 
substance of the policy but rather the manner in which such policy is conducted15.  De 
Burca argues that what truly sets apart the EU from other international actors is that 
in promoting its values and interest it has a clear preference “for the creation of 
stable, long-term, institutionalized relationships with other states and entities, and 
frequent use of regulatory frameworks involving common articulated goals and 
broad participation to regulate and coordinate policy externally”. In that sense, De 
Burca’s ‘governance mode’ conceptualization differs from Normative Power by 
avoiding any claim regarding the virtuousness of the EU’s external action argung 
that the EU’s default setting is to promote collective action and decision-making 
processes. 
 
Yet, it is by no means evident that unilateralism plays second fiddle to 
collective or cooperative action in the context of the EU’s external relations. In this 
respect, Bradford has highlighted the power that is wielded by the EU through the 
so-called “Brussels effect”16 which describes the EU’s power to unilaterally regulate !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!12!I.!Manners,!“The!European!Union!as!a!Normative!Power:!A!Response!to!Thomas!Diez”,!Millenium!35(1)!(2006)!167!at!173.!13!Ibid.!14!A.! Bradford! and! E.! Posner,! Universal! Exceptionalism! in! International!Law”!Harvard" International" Law" Journal! 52(1)! (2011)! 3C53.! See! also! S.! Safrin,!“The! UnCExceptionalism! of! U.S.! Exceptionalism,! Vanderbilt" Journal" of"
Transnational"Law!41(3)!(2008)!1307.!15!G.!De!Burca,! “EU!External!Relations:!The!Governance!Mode!of!Foreign!Policy”,! in! B.! Van! Vooren.! S.! Blockmans! and! J.! Wouters! (ed)! The" EU’s" Role" in"
Global"Governance!(Oxford:!Oxford!University!Press!(2012)!39!at!40.!16!A.!Bradford,!"!The!Brussels!Effect”!Northwestern"University"Law"Review"107!(2012)!1.!
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global markets. Whether in the area of competition law, data protection of chemical 
safety standards, Bradford demonstrates that third countries are compelled to follow 
the regulatory template set by the EU – however stringent these may be - in order to 
maintain the ability to access the EU’s lucrative market. In the Brussels effect, the 
EU’s global regulatory power manifests itself as almost an accidental byproduct of 
the EU’s economic power. But there is evidence that the EU is deliberately designing 
its regulations to govern the actions of persons and situations beyond its borders.  
For example, Scott has conducted a legal analysis of EU rules on climate change, air 
and transport services and financial services, demonstrating that the EU increasingly 
resorts to the practice of “territorial extension”17 whereby its laws can apply to 
circumstances and conduct which take place abroad as long as jurisdiction is 
triggered by the establishment of a territorial connection. 
 
A recent conceptual framework for the EU as a foreign policy power, 
developed by Damro, does away with the problematic debates concerning the 
substance and processes characterising the EU’s external action by positing that the 
idea of a Market Power Europe whereby the EU’s single market is identified as the 
EU’s main source of power in international relations as well the most important 
means through which such power is exercised18. Much like Normative Power Europe, 
the notion of Market Power Europe ascribes a sui generis identity to the EU, which it 
supposedly seeks to project abroad in the context of its foreign policy actions. 
However, contrary to Normative Power Europe, this identity is not based on a set of 
core norms and values but rather the prominence of a large regulated and integrated 
market. The distinction is significant as it means that although the EU remains a keen 
exporter of rules, it is not shackled to a closed set of substantive norms or values. For 
example, as Damro points out, whereas under Normative Power Europe, trade 
liberalization is linked to the core norm of liberty, under Market Power Europe, the 
EU can promote any policy or measure which reflect the preferences of the single 
market, including “market interventions via economic and social regulation”19.  
 
At the root of this power is the magnitude of the single market.  The EU is the 
biggest exporter of goods and services and the largest host of foreign investment in 
the world. The attractiveness of the market creates an incentive for States to converge 
their standards to those applied in the EU so as to reduce market access impediments !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!17 !J.! Scott,! “Extraterritoriality! and! Territorial! Extension! in! EU! Law”!
American"Journal"of"Comparative"Law!62:1!(2013)!87.!18!C.! Damro,! “Market! Power! Europe”! Journal" of" European" Public" Policy!19:5!(2012)!682!at!686.!19!Ibid.!
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and also provides considerable leverage for the EU if it wishes to impose a particular 
regulatory position on third countries 20 . There is, furthermore, an institutional 
component to Market Power Europe. Because of its experience in large-scale market 
integration and regulation, the EU has over time developed a sophisticated 
institutional framework built to weigh up varying and often-conflicting interests in 
the adoption of policies and regulation. This “regulatory capacity” 21  of the EU 
includes the ability to take into account the international dimension of regulatory 
measures (e.g., effect of EU rules on third countries, sanctions for non-compliance 
and interplay between domestic measures and international law) 22 . Finally, the 
decision-making process underpinning the adoption of EU rules allows for the 
participation of non-state actors, which allows interest groups to play a significant 
role in the externalization of EU regulation. Damro contends that these three 
inherent features of the single market create a basis for the EU’s identity as a market 
power23. In other words, the EU is ontologically prone to the externalization of EU 
market rules and policies, just as, under Normative Power Europe, the EU seems 
predisposed to project its normative foundations. However, the key difference is 
that, in Market Power Europe, there are no ethical or value based undertones to its 
external action. The EU’s foreign policy goals do not depart significantly from those 
of traditional powers and they are certainly not understood by reference to its 
attachment to universal norms or values or a preference towards cooperative forms 
of action. Instead, it is a limitation - that is, its over-reliance on its economic power, 
that sets its apart from the rest. 
 
3. WTO Dispute Settlement as a tool for the externalization of EU 
policy and rules 
 
The EU has historically been one of the main proponents of the multilateral 
trading system. It played a pivotal role in the successful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round negotiations that led to the establishment of the WTO and has, since, 
consistently pushed for the inclusion of further disciplines and the expansion of the 
organisation. One of the main reasons underlying the EU’s preference for the WTO 
as a rule-setting forum is that it offers an adjudicatory system that can issue legally 
binding and enforceable rulings24. In other words, the attractiveness of the WTO as a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!20!Ibid!at!687.!21!Ibid!at!683.!22!Ibid!687C688.!23!Ibid!at!698.!24!D.!De!Bievre,!“The!EU!regulatory!trade!agenda!and!the!quest! for!WTO!enforcement”,!Journal"of"European"Public"Policy!13:6!!(2006)!851!at!854C855.!
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regulatory forum can be attributed to the global reach of its rules as well as the fact 
that, unlike other fora, it offers credible and efficient dispute settlement and 
enforcement mechanisms25.  
 
The importance attached by the EU to the WTO Dispute settlement 
Mechanism seems to fit neatly with the idea of a Civilian Power Europe or a 
Normative Power Europe keen to conduct a foreign policy within the confines of 
international law and institutions. Indeed, the EU is one of the most prolific litigators 
in the WTO and has one of the best track records in terms of compliance with WTO 
rulings26. However, the EU’s compliance with WTO rules can, to a large extent, be 
explained by the fact that was one of the main architects of the multilateral trading 
system, WTO rules tend to reflect its own approach to market regulation. And whilst 
a number of studies have shown that although the EU does make efforts to ensure 
that its laws are WTO compliant, the fear of adverse rulings is not always at the 
forefront of the minds of EU decision makers when considering whether to adopt a 
piece of legislation27. In other words, whilst the EU portrays itself as a promoter of 
international law and effective multilateralism, it is certainly not averse to going it 
alone in order to pursue its interests or safeguards its preferences.  
 
However, this strand of research has focused on the impact of WTO law and 
rulings on the decision-making processes of EU regulators. Curiously, less research 
has been undertaken to assess the extent to which the EU uses the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism to spread the reach of its influence abroad. Yet, there is 
increasing evidence that policy makers in Brussels see the WTO’s adjudicatory 
system as an important tool to promote its interests and regulatory positions abroad. 
This is best exemplified by the European Commission’s 2006 Communication, 
“Global Europe: Competing in the world" (“Global Europe strategy”) 28  which !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!25!Ibid.!! 26A.!Young,!“Less!than!what!you!might!think:!The!impact!of!WTO!rules!on!EU!policies”,!in!O.!Costa!and!K.!Jorgensen!(eds.)!When"Multilateralism"hits"
Brussels:"The"Influence"of"International"Institutions"on"the"EU!(London:!Palgrave!MacMillan!(2012)),!23!at!40.!! 27!Ibid,!at!36;!F.!De!Ville,!“European!Union!regulatory!politics!in!the!shadow!of!the!WTO:!WTO!rules!as!a!frame!of!reference!and!rhetorical!device”!
Journal"of"European"Public"Policy!19:5!(2012)!700C718.!28!Communication! from! the! Commission! to! the! Council,! the! European!Parliament,!the!European!Economic!and!Social!Committee!and!the!Committee!of!the! Regions! GLOBAL! EUROPE:! COMPETING! IN! THE!WORLD!A! Contribution! to!the!EU's!Growth!and!Jobs!Strategy!COM/2006/0567!final.!!
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outlined the framework for the EU’s trade policy in the aftermath of the collapse of 
the WTO Doha Round Negotiations. This policy statement is significant in that it 
signalled a shift away from the EU’s focus on multilateral negotiations and set out 
the EU’s intent to pursue an aggressive trade policy whereby all avenues would be 
explored to pry open lucrative foreign markets. This includes, inter alia, the 
negotiation of comprehensive free trade agreements, the adoption of unilateral 
measures, the establishment of cooperative arrangements (e.g., trade dialogues) and, 
saliently, the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to enforce the EU’s 
rights whenever possible.  The approach is explained by Damro as follows: 
 
“[T]he EU may bring an offending foreign non-tariff barrier before the World 
Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Mechanism (i.e., negative 
tool). By doing so, the EU undertakes an intentional effort at externalization – 
an attempt to get the target WTO member(s) to comply with international 
trade rules in a way that generally satisfies or conforms to the EU's market-
related policies and regulatory measures. Bringing a foreign regulatory 
measure or any perceived violation of international trade rules to the WTO's 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism is a clear instance of the EU using coercion to 
adjust the behaviour of other actors in the international trading system. 
 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is therefore one of the many tools 
used by the EU to influence the regulatory policies of others. The EU uses WTO 
litigation as a means to coerce States to revise domestic regulations in line with its 
own regulatory positions. Moreover, as shown by Krueger, the EU is a strategic 
WTO litigant that uses the WTO dispute settlement mechanism “to shape WTO 
governance”29. The EU will launch or participate in disputes – that are in some cases 
of little relevance to it – in order to influence and set the rules of international trade 
by putting forward an interpretation of WTO law that promotes its long-term 
interests.  
 
 
4. WTO Dispute Settlement as a means to export the EU 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!29!T.!Kruger,!Shaping!the!WTO’s!Institutional!Evolution:!The!European!Union!as!a!Strategic!Litigant!in!the!WTO,!in:!D.!Kochenov,!F.!Amtenbrink!(eds.),!The!European!Union’s!Shaping!of!the!International!Legal!Order,!(Cambridge:!Cambridge!University!Press!(2013))!169!at!171.!
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The following section examines two case studies that illustrate how the EU 
uses the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and, in some cases, incorporates WTO 
litigation into its own domestic policy and regulatory frameworks, to project its 
interest and norms abroad. The first case study concerns the EU’s current external 
policy designed to ensure access to exhaustible mineral resources – a policy that 
expressly identifies WTO litigation as a route to achieve its objective and which has 
resulted in two challenges being brought against trade restrictive measures adopted 
by China with respect to raw materials and rare earths. The second subsection 
examines the EU’s current regulatory regime banning trade in seal fur produced 
under inhumane conditions which was, itself, the subject of a recent challenge before 
the WTO. Through these cases, it will be shown that the EU sees WTO dispute 
settlement as a means to secure its objectives and promote its own values and norms, 
and that the use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism does not reflect an 
attachment to or preference for the multilateral process, rather that the EU will assess 
all available policy options available to it (e.g., unilateralism, cooperation, WTO 
dispute settlement) and opt for the one that one which is more likely to successfully 
achieve its objectives. 
 
4.1 The EU’s Mineral Resources Policy 
 
4.1.1  EU Raw Materials Initiative 
 
The increasing volatility of commodity prices caused by the growing 
influence of finance as well as the surge in demand for already scarce mineral 
resources from emerging economies led the EU to develop its Raw Materials 
Initiative (RMI) – an integrated strategy designed to secure sustainable access to non-
energy and non-agricultural raw materials. The ‘raw materials’ covered by the RMI 
are metals and minerals that are typically sourced from specific geographical 
locations, have few substitutes and are used for the manufacture of high-technology 
products and in the environmental sector and have few substitutes30. Together, these 
factors mean that the countries producing such materials can successfully control 
global prices by limiting production or exports. This is effectively what occurred in 
2007-2008, where the application of export restraints (whether in the form of tariffs, 
export taxes or quantitative restrictions, or minimum purchase prices) by producers !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!30 !J.! Korinek,! and! K.! Jeonghoi,! "Export! restrictions! on! strategic! raw!materials! and! their! impact! on! trade! and! global! supply."! OECD! Trade! Policy!Studies! The! Economic! Impact! of! Export! Restrictions! on! Raw! Materials! 2010!(2010)!at!104.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!www.oecd.org/tad/ntm/43934153.pdf.!!
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of raw materials – and, in particular, China-led an exponential increase in prices of 
raw materials31.  
 
The EU’s external trade policy has thus become a key component of the RMI 
which it aims to ensure market access for European manufacturers to the raw 
materials on which they are critically dependent. This policy is based on three pillars: 
(i) ‘setting the rules of the game’ by imposing trade disciplines on export restrictions 
in the context of bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations; (ii) ‘enforcing the rules of 
the game’ by dispute settlement in order to remove barriers to access to raw 
materials; and (iii) ‘reaching out to third countries’ by establishing bilateral dialogues 
(notably in the context of the OECD).  The first two pillars are complementary. The 
EU negotiates the inclusion of disciplines on export restraints in trade agreements 
and then seeks the enforcement of such disciplines by using dispute settlement 
mechanisms, where available, or applying unilateral trade defense measures. The 
first pillar has led to the conclusion of various bilateral trade agreements as well as 
WTO accession agreements which have included prohibitions on export restraints 
(e.g., duties, taxes or measures of an equivalent effect on exportation)32.  
 
China has been the one of the main targets of the RMI. It is a mineral resource 
rich country that has strategically used export restraints to create a competitive 
advantage for domestic downstream producers who rely on raw materials33. This has 
been achieved, on the one hand, by restricting the supply of raw materials to foreign 
firms which, increases global prices and therefore undermines the ability of foreign 
firms to compete34 and, on the other hand, by ensuring that Chinese state-owned 
enterprises and domestic producers have access to raw materials at below market 
prices.35 With respect to China, to the extent that a trade agreement remains an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!31!M.!Bronkers!and!K.!Maskus,!“China!–!Raw!Materials:!a!controversial!step!towards!evenhanded!exploitation!of!natural!resources”!World"Trade"Review!13(2)!(2014)!393!at!394.!32!European!Commission,!“EU!Trade!Policy!for!Raw!Materials!Second!Activity!Report”,!30!May!2012,!p.10C14.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessingCmarkets/goodsCandCservices/rawCmaterials/!!33!B.!Karapinar,!“China’s!export!restriction!policies:!complying!with!‘WTO!plus’!or!undermining!multilateralism”!World"Trade"Review!10(3)!(2011)!390!at!401.! 34!A.!Willems!and!S.!De!Knop,! “The!EC!and!US!WTO!challenge! to!China's!export! restrictions:! will! it! increase! their! downstream! industries'!competitiveness?”!International"Trade"Law"and"Regulation!(2009),!171!at!172.!35!M.! Du,! “China's! state! capitalism! and!world! trade! law”" International"&"
Comparative"Law"Quarterly!63(2)!(2014)!411!at!425.!
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unlikely prospect in the short to medium term, the RMI has materialized mainly 
though two WTO disputes involving export restraints. 
 
 4.1.2 Raw Materials and Rare Earths disputes 
 
 The EU has launched two separate complaints against China regarding 
various export restraints on the exportation of certain mineral resources. In the first 
of these disputes, China – Measures relating to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials 
(“Raw Materials”)36, the EU, along with the United States and Mexico, lodged a 
complaint in 2009 against the application of quotas, export duties, minimum export 
prices on raw materials such as bauxite, coke, fluorspar, magnesium and manganese 
as well as additional requirements and procedures that must be fulfilled by exporters 
of such materials. The second dispute, China – Measures relating to the exportation of 
rare earths, tungsten and molybdenum (“Rare Earths”) concerned export restraints 
relating to so-called “rare earths” - 17 metals with specific chemical, magnetic and 
fluorescent properties and used in the manufacture of high technology goods such as 
telephones, computers and televisions37. In both cases, China has argued that the 
export restrictions were needed in order to manage what are non-renewable and 
rapidly dwindling natural resources. China holds the largest national reserve of rare 
earths accounting for approximately 9.5% of global supply, and has argued that at 
the current rate of exploitation its supply of rare earths will be exhausted within 30 
years. Based on this, it has adopted a number of policies designed to reduce the 
production of rare earths in a manner that would not adversely impact its domestic 
industry38. 
 
The export restrictions imposed by China were challenged on various 
grounds. Firstly, the complainants claimed that the quotas and minimum export 
prices violated a number of GATT obligations, most notably, Article XI GATT 
requiring all WTO Members to eliminate prohibitions and quantitative restrictions 
on exports. Secondly, it was claimed that the imposition of export duties on raw 
materials covered by the dispute was inconsistent with Article 11.3 of China’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!36!Panel!Report,!China"—"Measures"Related"to"the"Exportation"of"Various"
Raw"Materials,!WT/DS394/R,!5!July!2001;!Appellate!Body!report,!China"—"
Measures"Related"to"the"Exportation"of"Various"Raw"Materials,!WT/DS394/R,!30!January!20012.!37!Supra!footnote!30!at!117.!38!Supra!footnote!30!at!118.!
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Protocol of Accession39, which requires it to eliminate all taxes and charges applied to 
exports except with regard to products specifically listed in annex 6 of said protocol. 
Although China accepted that it had violated WTO rules, it argued that such 
measures could be justified on two grounds. With regard to export quotas, China 
invoked its right under Article XI GATT to temporarily apply quotas in order 
prevent or relieve critical shortages. The exception applies specifically to 
circumstances where it is established that there is a significant shortage or the 
likelihood of a significant shortage of a product that is essential for the exporting 
country. However, the argument was rejected by both the WTO Panel and the 
Appellate Body since the progressive depletion of an exhaustible resource was not 
deemed consistent with the notion of a ‘critical shortage’40, and the restraints had 
been in place for too long (in some cases more than a decade) to be considered 
temporary41 . 
 
China further argued that the export restraints could be justified under 
Article XX GATT, insofar as they constituted measures relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources42 or because they were necessary to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health43. This line of defense raised two questions. Firstly, with 
regard to the export duties, it was unclear whether general exceptions under Article 
XX GATT could be invoked in the context of WTO plus commitments made in the 
context of accession protocols. Previously, in China- Audiovisuals, the Appellate Body 
had ruled that restrictions on the importation of cultural goods violating the 
commitment under paragraph 5.1 of the Protocol to ensure the right to trade in all 
goods throughout its territory could be justified on the basis of Article XX GATT 
because the aforementioned paragraph 5.1 specifies that the right to trade that China 
committed to is “without prejudice to China’s right to regulate trade in a manner 
consistent with the WTO Agreement”44. However, in both China – Raw Material and 
China–Rare Earths, the Appellate Body found that Article XX general exceptions 
could not be made available to China since Paragraph 11.3 of the Protocol on taxes 
and duties to applied to imports or exports lacked any reference to Article XX GATT 
as well as any language relating to the China’s right to regulate ‘right to regulate’. 
Secondly, with regard to the export quotas applied by China, which were not !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!39!WTO,!Accession!of!the!People’s!Republic!of!China,!23!November!2001,!WT/L/432.!40!China"–"Raw"Materials,!Paragraph!336.!41!Ibid,!Paragraph!340.!42!Article!XX(g)!GATT.!!43!Article!XX(b)!GATT.!44!Paragraph!5.1!Protocol!of!Accession.!
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covered by the Accession Protocol, China argued that these were intended to ensure 
the conservation of exhaustible natural resources and therefore could be justified 
under Article XX(g) GATT. Both the Panel and the Appellate Body rejected the 
defense because China was not able to demonstrate that the concerned measures 
were “made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption" 45 . Because the export quotas were not accompanied by similar 
restrictions for domestic producers, it was found that such measures were not 
designed to address conservation concerns but rather to provide domestic producers 
an advantage against their competitors.  
 
The RMI related disputes are clear examples of how WTO litigation is 
deliberately being integrated within EU policy frameworks as a means to externalize 
its interests. Through the China-Raw Materials and the China-Rare Earths, the EU, 
along with other WTO Members, was able to force China to comply with the terms of 
the Accession Protocol, allowing it to secure market access to goods which it would 
otherwise not have secured by resorting to unilateral action or even by engaging in 
cooperative processes. Indeed, no bilateral trade agreement is currently envisaged 
between the EU and China and, in the context of the bilateral dialogue established by 
the EU with China, the evidence so far is that little progress has been made in terms 
of establishing common ground on issues pertaining to raw materials.46 In this sense, 
the place of pride occupied by WTO dispute settlement in the context of the RMI 
reflects in part the inability of the EU to effectively wield its market power against 
China.  
 
4.2 Seal Products Trade Ban 
 
4.2.1 EU Seal Trade Regulation 
 
The plight of seals has been an ongoing concern for animal activists within 
the EU for the better part of the last fifty years. Whilst a EU-wide ban on the import 
of seal pups furs and fur skin products had been in place since 1983, this regulation 
was not thought to have gone far enough by certain Member States who decided to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!45!Paragraph!5.2.2C5.2.9!Appellate!Body!Report!Rare!Earths.!46!European!Commission,!“EU!Trade!Policy!for!Raw!Materials!Second!Activity!Report”,!30!May!2012!at!18.!Retrieved!on!28!April!2015!http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessingCmarkets/goodsCandCservices/rawCmaterials/.!!!
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impose national bans on trade and processing of all seal products47. The proliferation 
of such national bans undermined the uniformity of the EU’s external trade regime 
and led the EU to enact a regulation banning trade in seal products. In 2009, the EU 
adopted the Regulation No 1007/200948 on trade in seal products prohibiting the 
placing on the market and the import or export of all seal products (Regulation). 
Three exceptions to the prohibition are specified under the Regulation and then 
further elaborated under the Commission Regulation No No 737/2010 
(Implementing Regulation) laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the 
Regulation49. They permit the placing on the market of seal products from hunts 
traditionally conducted by the Inuit and other indigenous communities (IC 
exemption), from hunting regulated under national law and conducted for the sole 
purpose of the sustainable development of marine resources; which have been 
imported by travellers or their families for non-commercial reasons.  
 
By the EU’s own admission the regulation was not adopted to ensure the 
conservation of an endangered species since the world seal population has steadily 
increased over the years. Rather, the ban sought to protect and promote European 
values regarding animal welfare and, in particular, to reflect the abhorrence 
generally felt by the EU population towards products derived from seals killed 
under inhumane conditions50. The Regulation was based on a scientific opinion 
delivered by the European Food Safety Authority, which found that the regulatory 
and management systems for seal hunting varied significantly from one State to 
another and that there was evidence that in in some cases the manner in which the 
killing is practice “causes avoidable pain, distress and other forms of suffering”51.  
 
The overarching aim pursued by this internal legislative measure is to 
discipline the regulatory environment and practices of non-EU States involved seal !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!47!R.! Howse! and! J.! Langille,! “Permitting! Pluralism:! The! Seal! Products!Dispute! and!Why! the!WTO! Should!Accept! Trade!Restrictions! Justified! by!NonCinstrumental!Moral!Values”"Yale"J."Int'l"L.!37!(2012)!367!at!374C377!48!Regulation! No! 1007/2009! of! the! European! Parliament! and! of! the!Council!of!16!September!2009!on!trade!in!seal!products)!OJ!L!286,!2009!at!36–39.! 49!Commission!Regulation!No!737/2010!of!10!August!2010!laying!down!detailed!rules!for!the!implementation!of!Regulation!(EC)!No!1007/2009!of!the!European!Parliament!and!of!the!Council!on!trade!in!seal!products!OJ!L!216,!2010!at!1–10!50!Recitals!4!and!5!of!Regulation!No!1007/2009.!51!European!Food!Safety!Authority!Animal!Welfare!aspects!of!the!killing!and!skinning!of!seals!C!Scientific!Opinion!of!the!Panel!on!Animal!Health!and!Welfare,!19!December!2007,!The"EFSA"Journal!(2007)!610!at!9.!
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hunting: access to the EU’s internal market is made contingent upon compliance 
with established standards relating to the effective killing of seals.  This is a clear 
illustration of how the EU acts as a market power, using the size of its internal 
market to trigger regulatory reform in third countries wishing to do business in the 
EU. It also reinforces the idea that, rather than having a preference towards 
cooperative processes in international relations, the EU will readily pursue the 
unilateral route where this option is more amenable to its immediate interests. For 
example, in the impact assessment conducted in 2008 on the impact of the trade ban 
on seal products, the European Commission considered the possibility of concluding 
bilateral and multilateral agreements to promote higher animal welfare standards as 
an alternative to an outright ban. At the time, this option may have appeared 
preferable, as the EU was about to initiate negotiations on an important trade deal 
with Canada52, the largest seal-hunting nation and the one which stood most to lose 
from the ban. An outright EU ban on trade in seal products was not viewed kindly 
by Canada, which had made no secret of its intention to challenge any such measure 
before the WTO dispute settlement body 53  – and may have scuppered the 
negotiations on a bilateral trade agreement. However, because of the importance 
attached to securing access to the EU’s internal market  (the EU is Canada’s second 
largest trading partner), the EU felt fairly secure in its assumption that the unilateral 
imposition of an added regulatory burden on Canada would not be sufficient to 
cause the collapse of negotiations54. Therefore, the EU had no qualms in resorting to 
unilateral action to force regulatory reform abroad since, in addition to being the 
most effective way of achieving its aims, this option would not cause any significant 
adverse impact to the European economy. 
 
4.2.2 EU –Seal Products dispute 
 
Canada and Norway challenged the Regulation arguing, inter alia, that the 
exemption of hunts conducted by Inuit and other indigenous communities from its 
scope violated Articles I (most favoured nation obligation), III (national treatment 
obligation and XI GATT (elimination of quantitative restrictions) as it de facto !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!52 !The! EUC! Canada! Comprehensive! Economic! and! Trade! Agreement!(CETA)!concluded!in!September!2014.!!Yet!to!be!approved!by!the!EU!Council!of!Ministers! and! the! European! Parliament.! Text! retrieved! 28! April! 2015!http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/inCfocus/ceta/.!!53!Euractiv,!2009.!‘Canada!vows!to!challenge!EU!seal!products!ban’,!28!August!2009.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!http://www.euractiv.com/trade/canadaCvowsCchallengeCeuCsealCprCnewsC222348.!!54!F.!De!Ville,!“Explaining!the!Genesis!of!a!Trade!Dispute:!the!European!Union’s!Seal!Trade!Ban”,!Journal"of"European"Integration!34(1)!(2012)!37!at!49.!
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discriminated against Canadian and Norwegian seal products55. This was because 
whereas Inuit and other indigenous communities represented the vast majority of 
seal hunters in Greenland, such communities comprised a small fraction of sealers in 
Norway and Canada. The IC exemption was designed and implemented in such a 
way as to ensure that all Greenland sealers were permitted to place their products in 
the EU internal market, whilst excluding the majority of Canadian and Norwegian 
sealers.  
 
The EU had anticipated this challenge and specifically addressed the WTO 
compatibility in the Impact Assessment which preceded the adoption of the 
Regulation:  
 
An import ban can be justified on the basis of the general exceptions 
contained in Article XX of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT), more specifically by invoking Article XX (a) under which the 
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures necessary 
to protect public morals (i.e "standards of right or wrong conduct 
maintained by or on behalf of a community or a nation") is allowed 
provided that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination. The 
proposed measure is not discriminatory, as the various prohibitions to 
be provided for will apply to intra-Community trade as well as to 
imports and exports.56 
 
The key question thus addressed successively by the WTO Panel and 
Appellate Body concerned whether the ban could be justified under the public 
morals exception of Article XX(a) GATT. In order to do so, the EU had to 
demonstrate that the ban was designed to protect public morals, that it was 
necessary to achieve these objectives and that it satisfied the requirements under the 
Article XX GATT chapeau prohibiting measures the measure from being arbitrary, 
unjustifiable, or a disguised restriction on international trade. In casu, both the Panel !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!55!Panel! Report," EUXMeasures" Prohibiting" the" Importation" and"Marketing"
of"Seal"Products!WT/DS400/AB/R! 25,!November! 2013;! Appellate! Body! report,"
EUXMeasures" Prohibiting" the" Importation" and" Marketing" of" Seal" Products!WT/DS400/AB/R,!22!May!2014.!56!European!Commission,!“Impact!Assessment!on!the!potential!impact!of!a!ban!on!products!derived!from!seal!species”!COM(2008)!469!final!at!53.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!http://ec.europa.eu/environment/biodiversity/animal_welfare/seals/seal_hunting.htm!!
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and the Appellate Body sided with the EU’s contention that the ban could be 
justified under Article XX(a). Firstly, with regards to the question of whether the 
protection of seal welfare was a legitimate public moral concerned covered by Article 
XX(a) GATT, the Panel found that that the “concept of public morals is a relative 
term which needs to be defined based on the standard of right and wrong in a given 
society”57 and, that in the particular context of this dispute it had been established 
that “the concerns of the EU public on animal welfare involve standards of right and 
wrong within the European Union as a community”58. Secondly, the Panel agreed 
that the ban was necessary to protect public morals insofar as was deemed “capable 
of making and does actually make a contribution” to the achievement of addressing 
public moral concerns as it “prevents to a certain extent the EU public from being 
exposed to and participating as consumers in commercial activities related to the 
products derived from seals that may have been killed inhumanely [and] also 
appears to have the effect of negatively impacting the global demand for seal 
product”. However, it was also found that the EU seals regime failed to satisfy the 
requirements under the chapeau of Article XX GATT chapeau since the 
discrimination entailed in the IC and MFM exemptions were found to be arbitrary or 
unjustifiable. For example, that the panel rejected that the regulatory distinction 
operated between commercial and IC hunts in Greenland, because, in practice, the 
manner in which Inuit hunts were conducted in Greenland bore all the hallmarks of 
large scale commercial hunts.  
 
In sum, although certain elements of the Regulation and the Implementing 
Regulation (e.g., IC exemption) were found to violate WTO law, the EU—Seal 
Products ruling confirmed that the trade ban itself could be justified because it 
sought to protect public morals commonly held by the EU’s population. In doing so, 
the ruling recognized the importance of pluralism and the right of WTO Members to 
regulate in accordance with their particular value systems which, given the wide 
membership of the organization, can vary significantly from one country to another59.  
Clearly, EU – Seal Products can be seen as an evidence of the WTO’s deference 
towards the regulatory and cultural diversity that characterizes its membership – 
trade restrictive measures may be adopted so long as they genuinely reflect cultural 
values, even where these are not necessarily shared by other WTO Members60. It is 
somewhat ironic then that the upshot of a ruling intended to recognize regulatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!57!EUXSeal"Products!paras!5.194C5.201!58!EUXSeal"Products!para!7.5!59!R.!Howse!and!J.!Languille,!supra!footnote!47!at!237C430.!60!Ibid!at!428C429.!
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diversity is to allow the EU to unilaterally disseminate its regulatory positions 
abroad. The primary objective of the EU seal ban may have been to ensure that 
European consumers are not faced with products derived from seals killed under 
inhumane conditions, but it is also designed to strong-arm third countries that wish 
to continue selling seal products in the lucrative EU internal market to change their 
regulatory systems in accordance with the EU’s domestic preferences.  Indeed, even 
before bringing the case before thw WTO’s judicature, Canada had taken steps to 
reform its seal hunt laws to ward off the threat of the EU trade ban61. 
 
The regime thus illustrates a particular manifestation of what Scott refers to 
as the ‘international orientation’ of EU lawmaking and its approach to norm 
exportation – the EU enacts laws, which require compliance with its own standards 
in order to extend market access to third countries, but ensures that such 
unilateralism is consistent with international law62. The EU Seal Regime may have 
been primarily driven by strong domestic political preferences but by anticipating 
the possibility of a WTO challenge and by designing the relevant regulations in line 
with WTO law, the EU has sought to ensure that the external repercussions of these 
regulations are not undermined by adverse WTO rulings. In this sense, rather than 
being a constraint on regulatory autonomy, WTO law furthers the EU’s policy 
agenda and, in particular, external policy objectives pursued by EU domestic 
legislation. 
  
5.  Questioning the distinctiveness of the EU as an international actor 
 
Both the RMI and the EU ban on trade in seals can be used as examples of the 
how the EU acts as a normative power. In both cases the EU has a devised policy or 
regulatory framework which is intend to promote certain foundational normative 
values abroad. With regard to the RMI, the goal of securing market access to key 
mineral resources can be linked to the EU’s attachment to economic freedoms that 
underpin the functioning of the internal market.  The EU trade in seals ban intends to 
protect and promote EU environmental standards and, more generally, sustainable 
development goals. Furthermore, the reliance on the WTO dispute settlement 
mechanism and the efforts undertaken by EU legislators to ensure WTO compliance 
of EU domestic legislation underlines the EU’s commitment to the rule of law and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!61!Bridges!Weekly.!“Canadian!Delegation!in!Brussels!to!Stop!Proposed!Seal!Ban”!Bridges!Weekly!13(3)!28!January!2009.!Retrieved!28!April!2015!http://www.ictsd.org/bridgesCnews/bridges/news/canadianCdelegationCinCbrusselsCtoCstopCproposedCsealCban.!!62!J.!Scott!supra!footnote!17!at!114.!
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international law and institutions.  These two examples also reflect key elements of 
Market Power Europe. It is most evident in the context of the EU Seal regime where 
the EU, firstly, used the threat of the removal of market access as a tool to influence 
the behavior of third countries and, secondly, where benefitted from its significant 
regulatory capacity to assess the international dimension and external implications 
of the projected regulatory framework. Prior to the enactment of the regulations 
establishing the EU trade in seals ban, the EU assessed the various options available 
to it – unilateralism, bilateralism and multilateralism - and opted for unilateral action 
because it was deemed the most effective course of action. Indeed as the third 
countries targeted by the regime are heavily dependent on access to the EU’s internal 
market, the EU could use market access as leverage to secure the type of regulatory 
reforms it was seeking from such countries.  In other words, there was no preference 
towards multilateral cooperation; where the EU’s market power is sufficient to 
achieve its aims, the EU is not averse to going it alone as long as this suits its 
immediate interests.  In addition, the EU anticipated the inevitability of a challenge 
before the WTO and addressed the issue of WTO compatibility by ensuring that its 
regulations were largely non-discriminatory and that the trade restrictions could be 
reasonably justified under the GATT general exceptions provisions. But features of 
Market Power Europe can also be identified with respect to the RMI. When 
developing this policy framework, the EU understood that an economic powerhouse 
such as China was unlikely to be concerned by any decision by the EU to bar access 
to its market. The decision of EU policy makers to rely on WTO law and institutions 
reflects an acceptance that, as far as China is concerned, the exercise of market power 
would be a pointless exercise.  
 
The above considerations demonstrate that whilst conceptualisations such as 
Normative Power Europe and Market Power Europe are useful tools to understand 
the EU’s role international actor, they do not represent, on their own, all-
encompassing theoretical frameworks explaining the EU’s external action. This 
brings us back to the question whether there is anything fundamentally distinctive in 
the manner that the EU seeks to exert power in international relations when 
compared to traditional foreign policy powers such as the US. The supposed 
‘exceptionalism’ of the US, the conviction that the norms and values espoused by the 
US should be held as a model by for the international community, could easily also 
apply to the EU. The idea of Normative Power Europe itself is based on the premise 
that the EU sees itself as a regulatory model to be emulated by others and Market 
Power Europe accepts that the EU seeks to export its standards abroad in order to, 
inter alia, facilitate the ability of EU forms to access foreign markets.  A counter-
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argument to the contention of the EU’s exceptionalism would be that the values 
promoted by the EU are universal and, even if tainted by self-interest, they seek to 
benefit the entire international community as a whole63.  However, as the EU-Seals 
dispute demonstrates, this argument does not stand up to scrutiny. The EU’s values 
are not necessarily shared by all, but rather reflect its historical cultural and political 
preferences.  In fact, as shown by Bradford and Posner, a consistent and defining 
characteristic of exceptionalist States is that they seek to pass off norms reflecting 
domestic preferences as universal norms64 . This is achieved by influencing the 
development of international law in the context of treaty negotiations as well as 
pursuing compliance with international law in accordance their preferences. 
Bradford and Posner convincingly argue that the EU routinely pursues domestic 
policy preferences in the context of international institutions such as the WTO65. This 
is in line with the views of other international relations scholars, such as Young, who 
have posited that the EU’s attachment to the multilateral trading system can be 
explained by the fact that the rules of the WTO reflects its own values and interests66. 
A notable and recent example is the negotiation of WTO plus rules in China’s 
Accession Protocol, which significantly restrict China’s regulatory autonomy, and 
has allowed the EU – amongst others – to secure market access to Chinese raw 
materials.  And at the stage of compliance, the EU-Seals dispute is an ideal case study 
of how the EU uses the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to promote 
interpretations of WTO law that embody its values.  
 
A defense of the EU against possible accusations of ‘exemptionalism’ in the 
sphere of WTO law is perhaps on surer ground. In both the RMI disputes the EU 
challenged Chinese measures that clearly violated WTO law and in the EU-Seals 
dispute, the EU took care to ensure that internal regulation reflecting domestic 
political preferences were broadly WTO compliant. The overwhelming evidence 
suggests that the EU has a positive record as far as WTO compliance is concerned67. 
Here again, it must be pointed out that compliance is to a large extent a byproduct of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!63!A.!Van!den!Hooven,!“Regulatory!capitalism!and!multilateral!trade”.!In!S.!Lucarelli! and! I.!Manners! (eds.)!Values"and"Principles"in"European"Union"Foreign"
Policy!(Oxford:!Routledge!(2006)!185!at!198;!I.!Manners!&!T.!Diez,!“Reflecting!on!Normative!Power!Europe”.!In!F.!Berenskoetter,!&!M.!J.!Williams!(Eds.),"Power"in"
World"Politics.!(New!York:!Routledge!(2007))!173!at!181.!64!Supra!footnote!14!at!53.!65!Supra!footnote!14!at!14C23.!66!A.!Young,!supra!footnote!26!!at!123C124.!67!B.!Wilson,!“Compliance!by!WTO!Members!with!Adverse!WTO!Dispute!Settlement!Rulings:!The!Record!to!Date”!Journal"of"International"Economic"Law!10(2)!(2007)!397C403;!A!Young,!supra!footnote!26!at!23.!
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the fact that WTO reflects the norms, values and interests of the EU. Even so, in the 
few instances where EU measures have been found to violate WTO law, there are 
cases where the EU has chosen against compliance where this would run counter to 
its immediate interests68. Overall, the foregoing paints a picture of the EU that 
corresponds to that of the stereotypical exemptionalist: an international actor that 
shapes and enforces the rules of the international legal system but seeks “to insulate 
itself from the domestic blowback of […] the multilateral instruments it has created”69 
 
All this, of course, is not to say that the EU’s modus operandi as an 
international trade actor is identical to that of other international actors. As discussed 
above, the norms and values promoted by the EU in the WTO are in many instances 
specific to it. Likewise, the sui generis nature of the EU’s regulatory process means 
that it is better placed than most to design measures that not only comply with 
international law but also contribute to the furtherance of the EU’s foreign policy 
goals. In this respect, the two case studies examined in this paper have put the 
spotlight on a particularly interesting feature of the EU’s role in shaping WTO law - 
that is, that the potential for WTO litigation is increasingly taken into account by the 
EU in the process of developing policies and regulatory measures as a tool to export 
EU interests, norms and values. These features of the EU’s external action, in realm 
of the international trading system, however novel, reflect shared values amongst EU 
Members States as well as the institutional specificities of the EU’s regulatory 
processes.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This article has examined the EU’s relationship with the WTO – and more 
specifically its approach to WTO litigation – to debunk identity narratives, such as 
Normative Power Europe, that present the EU as distinctive foreign policy actor 
ontologically predisposed to project of universal norms or values and to eschew 
coercion or unilateralism in favour of cooperative forms of action. The EU was a 
major force behind the conclusion of the WTO agreements and has subsequently 
shaped the evolution of its rules in the context of the negotiation of WTO accession 
agreements as well as through its participation in WTO litigation. In doing so, the EU 
has ensured that the WTO represents a legal order that reflects the EU’s foreign 
policy objectives. However, whether it is in securing old-fashioned free trade 
imperatives of opening foreign markets or disseminating rules, these objectives !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!68!Ibid!at!23C41.!69!J.!Ruggie,!supra!footnote!1,!at!6.!
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remain very much Euro-centric and do not necessarily underpin any form of 
attachment towards universal norms and values. In the same vein, although the EU 
does appear to be committed to cooperation in the context of its international 
relationships, the strength of this commitment will vary from one case to another 
depending on its interests. The EU has put the WTO at the forefront of its policy 
designed to open foreign markets for mineral resources because it knows it has little 
leverage against the key producers of such commodities. Conversely, with respect to 
its ban on products derived from seal hunts, the EU carefully scrutinized the various 
policy options available to it (which included the possibility of negotiating 
agreements with States currently engaged in seal hunting practices) but opted for a 
unilateral action because its significant economic leverage over the offending 
countries would be the most effective way of forcing their hand.  
 
The source of the EU’s power – its reliance on economic or ‘market’ power – 
is the only truly distinctive aspect of its power. However, the reliance on its market 
and regulatory power is not the result of a choice but purely reflects the fact that as a 
supranational organization based on economic integration, the EU’s internal market 
remains its most effective tool to exert influence abroad. In this sense the use of 
market power is purely the byproduct of the EU’s own internal limitations. Beyond 
this, there is fundamentally nothing that is inherently unique about the EU’s external 
trade action. It attempts to protect and promote its interests by shaping the 
international community and legal order in its own image. This is the archetypal 
modus operandi of great foreign policy powers – the desire to set the rules of the 
game in a manner that both promote your values and interests whilst, 
simultaneously, shielding that power from the adverse consequences of such rules. 
The manner in which the power is exercised is also indistinctive. The EU is 
pragmatic in its choice of tools. It will use existing international fora to pursue 
foreign policy goals when this suits its interests, but will also readily pursue other 
options that may be more effective in securing those interests.   
